

A Brief for
Santa Marta Conference
2026

**Stop False Solutions:
Realize A Just
Energy Transition**

Urgency of the Santa Marta Conference 2026

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Introduction

The Santa Marta Conference, scheduled for April 24–29, 2026, in Santa Marta, Colombia, marks a crucial turning point in the history of global climate diplomacy. This conference did not emerge from a vacuum—it arose as a response to the failure of formal processes that are often trapped in incremental bureaucracy, focused on making marginal improvements to existing policies to avoid major conflicts and minimize the risk of error (CAN Europe, 2026; CIEL, 2026).

In the context of 2026, the world is facing the most severe energy crisis in modern history, triggered by the military conflict between the United States–Israel and Iran that erupted in February 2026. This crisis—described by IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol as a shock surpassing the combined crises of 1973, 1979, and 2022—has laid bare the structural vulnerabilities of global dependence on fossil fuels (IDDRI, 2026). For the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI), participation in this conference is not merely attending an international meeting; it is a mandate to voice the urgency of a total halt to fossil energy, which has long been at the root of the climate crisis and ecological disasters in our homeland (Republika, 2026).

The Santa Marta Conference, initiated by the governments of Colombia and the Netherlands, is designed as a safe channel for a coalition of high-ambition

countries and non-governmental actors to formulate concrete steps toward fossil fuel phase-out outside the UNFCCC framework, which is often hampered by consensus requirements. This two-track multilateralism approach enables countries like Colombia to lead a second wave of signatories to the Belém Declaration, affirming a global commitment to transitioning away from coal, oil, and natural gas rapidly, justly, and in a human-centered manner. For WALHI, this momentum is critical because the energy sector contributes approximately 74.5% of global greenhouse gas emissions as of 2024, compounded by methane's contribution of 17.9% (European Parliament, 2026). Without an immediate halt to fossil fuel expansion, the global temperature limitation targets will remain mere political rhetoric (WALHI, 2025).

At the national level, Indonesia continues to face a dilemma between fiscal dependence on extractive commodities and the urgent need to protect its people from the impacts of the climate crisis. The fossil fuel sector has become a significant burden on the State Budget (APBN) through large subsidies, while its health impacts claim millions of lives every year (Republika, 2026). Data shows that air pollution from fossil fuel combustion causes approximately 4.2 million premature deaths annually worldwide (European Parliament, 2026). In Indonesia, the dominance of coal in the primary energy mix—reaching 40.37% in 2024—continues to perpetuate environmental pollution and trigger respiratory illnesses (ISPA) among communities around mining and power generation areas (Mongabay, 2025a; 2025b). WALHI's participation in Santa Marta aims to assert that energy transition must be viewed not merely as a technology replacement, but as a systemic transformation that must prioritize people's sovereignty and environmental restoration (WALHI East Java, 2025; UNAIR, 2025).

Table 1: Emissions Projections and Global Fossil Fuel Phase-Out Targets (Santa Marta 2026 Context)

Fossil Component	Global Emissions Contribution (2024)	Phase-Out Target (Paris Aligned)	Santa Marta 2026 Goal
Coal	74.5% (with other fossil fuels)	2030 (Global/OECD)	Commitment to immediate phase-out without exception
Natural Gas	Significant methane emissions contributor	2035 (Developed Countries)	Ban on new infrastructure expansion
Oil	Driver of transport and industrial emissions	2040-2050 (Final Phase)	Integration with Fossil Fuel Treaty
Fossil Subsidies	Massive fiscal burden	Elimination 2025-2030	Redirect funds to community renewable energy

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The Anatomy of Fossil Energy Dependence in Indonesia

Indonesia's current energy situation remains far from the aspirations of an ambitious transition. As of 2024, the national primary energy mix is still dominated by coal at 40.37%, oil at 28.82%, and natural gas at 16.17%, while renewable energy has only reached 14.65% (Mongabay, 2025a). This reality shows that the government's energy transition narrative often remains merely declarative on paper, without concrete steps to end fossil energy dominance. Policies such as Government Regulation No. 40 of 2025 on the National Energy Policy (KEN) are actually seen as providing new legitimacy for coal and gas use well beyond the middle of this century. The KEN stipulates that coal will continue to account for 47-50% of the energy mix in 2030 and will remain at 8-10% through 2060 (WALHI, 2025).

This strategy creates a dangerous carbon lock-in risk, where new infrastructure investments will force the country to continue burning fossil fuels to sustain the economic viability of assets that should already have been retired. Dependence on natural gas has also become a new trap in the national energy strategy. Gas is often promoted as a transition alternative or bridge fuel, but data shows that gas infrastructure is at high risk of becoming stranded assets due to global price fluctuations and high methane emissions during extraction and distribution (European Parliament, 2026; WALHI, 2025).

WALHI highlights that in the East Java Regional Energy General Plan (RUED), natural gas is still planned to contribute 13.3% of the energy mix, while the New and Renewable Energy (NRE) mix in 2022 had only reached 9.36%, far short of the 12.15% target for 2025. This gap between targets and on-the-ground reality reflects a lack of political will to undertake a fundamental transformation of the energy supply structure, which remains highly extractive and centralized (WALHI, 2023; WALHI East Java, 2025).

In Jakarta, the portrait of energy transition also shows similar challenges. The DKI Jakarta RUED 2023-2050 shows a dramatic increase in natural gas consumption, from 3,304 MTOE in 2020 to 12,423 MTOE in 2050. Meanwhile, the rooftop solar potential of 225 MW in Jakarta has only been utilized at about 0.5 MW or 0.2%, due to various regulatory barriers from PLN, such as capacity restrictions and high installation costs (WALHI Jakarta, 2024). This shows that the energy transition in Indonesia is still hindered by a rigid electricity system monopoly that does not allow space for people's energy sovereignty (WALHI, 2024a).

Table 2: Reality of Indonesia's Energy Mix (2020-2024) and KEN Targets

Energy Source	2020 Actual (%)	2024 Actual (%)	KEN 2030 Target (%)	Environmental/Health Impact
Coal	32.4 (E.Java)/40+ (Nat.)	40.37	47-50	High CO2 emissions, FABA waste, respiratory illness
Oil	44.9 (E.Java)/28+ (Nat.)	28.82	Gradual decrease	Urban air pollution, subsidy burden
Natural Gas	13.3 (E.Java)/16+ (Nat.)	16.17	12.9-14.2	Methane leakage, stranded asset risk
Renewable Energy	9.36 (E.Java)/11+ (Nat.)	14.65	19-23	High potential but hindered by regulation

3

Rejecting False Solutions in Climate Mitigation

One of WALHI's main pillars of struggle at the Santa Marta Conference is the rejection of what are called false solutions. False solutions refer to a range of technologies and market mechanisms claimed to address climate change, but which in reality extend the lifespan of the fossil energy industry, worsen environmental damage, or deflect genuine emissions reduction responsibilities (WALHI, 2025; WALHI, 2023b).

3.1 Biomass Co-firing and Deforestation Disguised as Renewable Energy

The co-firing program at coal-fired power plants (PLTUs) is one of the most dangerous false solutions according to WALHI's data. This mechanism involves mixing coal with biomass—such as wood pellets or waste—with the claim of reducing the carbon intensity of existing power plants (LBH Bandung & Koalisi Kutub, 2023; CELIOS, 2024a). However, research shows that co-firing is used to legitimize extending the operational life of coal power plants that should be immediately retired (CELIOS, 2024a). Furthermore, the massive demand for wood biomass feedstock has triggered large-scale deforestation through the development of Energy Plantation Forests (HTE) (WALHI, 2025; Yayasan PIKUL, 2025).

Data on wood biomass exports from Indonesia to Japan paints a troubling picture. From 2012 to 2023, wood pellet exports to Japan skyrocketed by 254,275%. This surge in demand is driving the systematic clearing of natural forests to be converted into homogeneous monoculture eucalyptus or acacia

plantations. This ecological simplification not only destroys biodiversity but also releases carbon from soil and humus that should serve as long-term carbon stores (CELIOS, 2024a). WALHI firmly states that energy generated from forest clearance cannot be categorized as clean energy (WALHI, 2025).

Tabel 3: Lonjakan Permintaan Biomassa Kayu (Wood Chips & Pellets) Indonesia ke Jepang (2012–2023)

Commodity	Increase (%)	Main Ecological Impact	Legal Status
Wood Pellets	254,275%	Deforestation of HTEs, loss of biodiversity	Potential illegal exports (trade data discrepancies)
Wood Chips	4,377.5%	Landscape change, disruption of water cycle	Linked to community land grabbing
Related Emissions	Global carbon debt	562,848 tons CO ₂ /year (est. PT Korintiga Hutani)	Greenwashing Japan's energy sector

3.2 Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and CCUS: A Fossil Industry Gimmick

Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS/CCUS) technology is also a target of sharp criticism from WALHI. Although promoted as a vital instrument toward Net Zero Emissions (NZE), the implementation cost of this technology is extremely high, ranging from USD 60 to over USD 1,000 per ton of CO₂. For WALHI, the allocation of such large amounts of public funds to technology that has not been proven commercially viable at scale is a waste of resources (WALHI, 2023; Handayani et al., 2025). Instead, these funds should be allocated directly to the development of safer and more affordable solar and wind energy.

More dangerously, CCS is often used as a justification for continued extraction of oil and gas through Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) or Enhanced Gas Recovery (EGR) methods (Leks & Co, 2024; Taraki et al., 2024). By re-injecting CO₂ into old oil wells, oil and gas companies can extract remaining fossil reserves that were previously difficult to reach. This creates a vicious cycle of emissions where technology claimed as a climate solution is actually used to burn more fossil fuels. The risk of CO₂ leakage from underground storage also threatens groundwater quality and the safety of communities living above those geological formations (Sule, 2020).

3.3 Nuclear Ambitions: High Risk and Intergenerational Burden

WALHI's rejection of plans to build Nuclear Power Plants (PLTN) in Indonesia is based on five main reasons: dependence on foreign parties, high construction

costs that will burden taxpayers, potential to become an instrument of mass casualties due to radiation, opportunities for corruption, and the risk of permanent ecological disaster (Detiknews, 2012). Given Indonesia's geographical position in the Ring of Fire, the risk of nuclear accidents due to tectonic activity is very real, as demonstrated by the Fukushima disaster in Japan (Betahita, 2024; WALHI, 2024b).

Beyond accident risk, the problem of radioactive waste remains an unjust burden for future generations, as such waste will remain hazardous for thousands of years without a truly safe and tested permanent storage solution. Nuclear expert Dr. Iwan Kurniawan asserts that no nuclear technology is 100% immune to radiation risks, and the use of this energy in Indonesia is more project-oriented than driven by genuine energy needs (WALHI, 2024b).

Table 4: Risk Analysis of False Energy Solutions from WALHI's Perspective

False Solution	Government/Industry Claim	Facts and Risks (WALHI/CSO)	Socio-Ecological Impact
Biomass Co-firing	Reduces PLTU carbon intensity	Extends coal life, triggers HTE deforestation	Agrarian conflict, loss of forest ecological functions
CCS / CCUS	Captures emissions from fossil sources	High cost (USD 60-1,000/ton), leakage risk	Perpetuates fossil extraction through EOR/EGR
Nuclear Energy	Clean, stable, low-emission energy	Risk of permanent disaster, toxic waste, high cost	Intergenerational injustice, foreign technology dependence
Coal Gasification	Coal downstream value addition	Economically unviable, high air pollution	Respiratory illness, state losses from 0% royalties
Waste-to-Energy (Incinerator)	Solution to waste & energy problems	Release of dangerous dioxins, ignores waste reduction	Health impacts on urban poor communities

4

Just Energy Transition: From Paradigm to Action

For WALHI, a just energy transition is not merely installing solar panels on elite rooftops—it is a total restructuring of the ownership and control over energy (WALHI, 2023). A just energy transition must be grounded in the pillars of human rights protection, accountability, transparency, democratic participation, and ecological justice (WALHI Jakarta, 2024). This means ensuring that indigenous peoples, women, workers, and other vulnerable groups are not sacrificed for green ambitions managed by large corporations (WALHI, 2023c).

4.1 Critique of Transition Financing and the JETP Debt Trap

The Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), launched at the G20 Bali Summit, is one of the transition financing schemes under critical scrutiny. WALHI notes that the USD 20 billion commitment in JETP is dominated by debt instruments (reaching 99%) rather than grants (WALHI, 2023). This scheme is feared to add to the state's fiscal burden, which had already reached Rp 8,338 trillion in April 2024 (SIEJ, 2024). Rather than helping decarbonization, this debt-laden financing scheme may force the government to continue exploiting natural resources to pay the interest, creating new cycles of poverty and environmental destruction (WALHI, 2023).

Transparency in the management of JETP funds is also considered extremely minimal. The appointment of PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur (SMI) as the state platform for managing transition funds is seen as lacking in legal accountability and difficult for the public to monitor. Without strong oversight mechanisms and civil society involvement at every stage of decision-making, transition funds are at serious risk of being channelled into large-scale infrastructure projects that instead grab community land or destroy important ecosystems (WALHI, 2023; CELIOS, 2023b).

4.2 People's Energy Sovereignty: Decentralization and Community Management

As an alternative to the centralistic energy model dominated by PLN and oligarchs, WALHI promotes the concept of People's Energy Sovereignty. This concept emphasizes the development of small-scale renewable energy independently managed by communities according to local resource potential. This decentralization model is considered more efficient because it minimizes transmission losses and ensures that the economic benefits remain in the hands of residents (WALHI, 2023; WALHI, 2024a).

A successful example of people's energy sovereignty can be seen in Seloliman Village, Mojokerto, where the community has managed the Kalimaron Micro-Hydropower Plant (PLTMH) since 1994. This project started from the residents' desire to have affordable electricity without damaging the environment. With technical support from Germany and community cooperation, this PLTMH is able to power hundreds of homes and generate income for the village through transparent management by a residents' association. However, such initiatives are often threatened by electricity regulations that monopolize the right to supply electricity, where the arrival of the PLN grid often ends up shutting down independently operating micro-hydro plants that were already running well (WALHI, 2024a).

A similar case occurred in Silit Village, West Kalimantan, which successfully managed a PLTMH independently. The success of these initiatives proves that energy transition does not have to depend on massive projects requiring large foreign investment. Instead, the government should provide incentives and legal certainty for community energy cooperatives to develop and sustainably meet their own energy needs (UNAIR, 2025; Bijak Memantau, 2024).

Table 5: Comparison of Centralistic Energy Model vs. People's Energy Sovereignty

Dimension	Centralistic Model (Status Quo)	People's Energy Sovereignty (WALHI Alternative)
Ownership	Large corporations, State (SOEs)	Community, cooperatives, local residents
Energy Source	Fossil fuel dominance (Coal, Gas)	Renewable energy (Micro-hydro, Solar, Wind)
Distribution	Long-distance transmission networks (wasteful)	Efficient local microgrid systems
Decision-Making	Top-down, closed, minimal participation	Democratic, community-based (FPIC)
Economic Benefits	Profits for elites and investors	Community welfare, local maintenance funds
Ecological Risk	Deforestation, pollution, large-scale waste	Minimal impact, integrated with forest conservation

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The Impact of Extractivism and Unjust Transition in the Regions

The global energy transition ambition requiring critical minerals like nickel for electric vehicle batteries has created a new wave of destructive extractivism in eastern Indonesia. In North Maluku, nickel mining on Obi Island has resulted in 26,100 hectares of deforestation over the past decade (SIEJ, 2024). The impact is felt not only in the loss of forest cover, but also in the destruction of the livelihoods of fishing and farming communities (WALHI, 2024c).

WALHI's field data shows that nickel mining waste has contaminated community water sources, making the water taste salty and causing stomach illness when consumed. At sea, sedimentation pollution has turned the water murky and yellow, destroying coral reef ecosystems and driving fish away from the reach of traditional fishermen. This demonstrates that what is claimed as an energy transition at the global level is often an ecological disaster transition for local communities whose living spaces are destroyed to meet the demand for a low-carbon lifestyle in other parts of the world (WALHI, 2024c; School Media, 2024).

Criminalization of environmental defenders who oppose mine expansion is also increasing. In East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), residents who oppose geothermal projects in Wae Sano and other areas often face intimidation and criminal charges. WALHI NTT firmly states that geothermal energy forced upon communities without their consent is not environmentally friendly energy--it is a new instrument of oppression done in the name of climate (WALHI & Celios, 2024). Construction of large-scale energy infrastructure on customary or productive land without proper FPIC procedures is a serious violation of people's sovereignty (WALHI, 2023).

Table 6: Ecological Disasters and Conflicts Related to Energy & Extractive Projects
(WALHI Data 2024-2026)

Region	Project/Activity	Key Identified Impacts	Conflict/Case Status
Obi Island, North Maluku	Nickel Mining (Downstream)	26,100 ha deforestation, marine pollution, saltwater contamination	Destruction of women fishers' livelihoods
Batang Toru, North Sumatra	Hydropower / Gold Mining	Watershed damage, 72,938 ha deforestation	Threat to Tapanuli Harangan ecosystem
Wae Sano, NTT	Geothermal Project	Community rejection, geophysical risk near settlements	Criminalization of project opponents
Jambi & South Sumatra	Coal Mining	Open mining pits, truck dust pollution, respiratory illness	Residents forced to leave their settlements
Seloliman, East Java	Community PLTMH	Clean, affordable electricity for 600+ residents	Threat from centralized PLN grid intervention

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Legal Challenges

Efforts toward energy transition in Indonesia are further complicated by the weakening of environmental protection standards following the passage of Law No. 6 of 2023 on Job Creation (Omnibus Law). WALHI views this law as an instrument that facilitates extractive licensing by curtailing meaningful public participation and weakening environmental law enforcement instruments (WALHI, 2025; SIEJ, 2024). The elimination of the environmental permit requirement, replaced by an environmental approval within a risk-based business licensing scheme, has created a large loophole for corporations to disregard the socio-ecological impacts of their operations (ICEL, 2021).

On the other hand, there is a threat from the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism in international investment agreements. ISDS allows foreign fossil energy companies to sue the Indonesian government in international

arbitration if energy transition policies – such as early retirement of coal power plants or bans on coal burning – are deemed harmful to their profit potential. WALHI urges the Indonesian government to boldly exit investment agreements containing ISDS clauses in order to preserve state sovereignty in setting ambitious climate policies without fear of financially crippling legal action (CAN Europe, 2026; CIEL, 2026).

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WALHI's Demands

Based on an in-depth analysis of Indonesia's energy and environmental realities, WALHI brings a set of strategic demands to the 2026 Santa Marta Conference. These demands are directed at both the Indonesian government and the international community to ensure a truly just transition.

1. Immediate Halt to Fossil Fuel Expansion and a Ban on False Solutions

Conference participating countries must commit to halting new permits for coal mining, oil and gas drilling, and any new coal power plant construction. This includes firmly rejecting the use of wood biomass for co-firing, CCS/CCUS technology as a fossil fuel perpetuator, and high-risk nuclear power plant construction. The Indonesian government must immediately revise the KEN and RUPTL to align with the 1.5-degree Celsius pathway without relying on speculative false technologies.

2. Transition Financing Based on Grants and Free from Debt

The international community—especially developed countries that bear the greatest ecological debt—must fulfil climate financing commitments of USD 300 billion per year in the form of predictable public grants, not loans. Transition financing in Indonesia, including through the JETP mechanism, must undergo social and environmental auditing and be managed with full transparency principles that enable active public participation. Debts arising from fossil fuel projects in the past should be cancelled to create fiscal space for a sustainable energy transition.

3. Institutionalization of People's Energy Sovereignty

The government must create a regulatory framework that prioritizes community- and cooperative-based renewable energy over corporate large-scale projects. This includes reforming the PLN system that hinders the development of local microgrids, provision of permanent funds for people's energy initiatives, and legal recognition of citizens' rights to produce and manage their own energy.

4. Environmental Restoration and Justice for Extractive Regions

The energy transition must not forget the restoration of ecosystems damaged by the fossil fuel and mining industries of the past. Energy and mining companies must be held fully accountable for the watershed damage, deforestation, and marine pollution they have caused. Restoration programs must be designed together with affected communities and must guarantee the return of the right to a healthy living space for women fishers, farmers, and indigenous peoples.

5. Dismantling Global Structural Barriers (ISDS & Fossil Treaty)

Indonesia is encouraged to fully support the establishment of a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty as a binding international framework to manage the just global phase-out of fossil fuel production. Furthermore, Indonesia must join an alliance of ISDS-free countries to eliminate the threat of corporate lawsuits against national environmental policies.

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Closing

The 2026 Santa Marta Conference is quite strategic for Indonesia to demonstrate its genuine climate commitment. However, this commitment will not be visible because national policy is still held hostage by the interests of the coal oligarchy and the trap of false solutions. WALHI's analysis shows that the cost of delayed transition is far greater than the cost of investment - especially when measured in lives lost, ecosystem damage, and the lost future of coming generations.

A just and sovereign energy transition can only be achieved if we stop treating energy as a mere commodity and start viewing it as a fundamental human right. Therefore, by strengthening the foundation of people's energy, rejecting low-effectiveness technological tricks, and ensuring the accountability of extractive industries, Indonesia can break free from the grip of the climate crisis toward a truly clean, independent, and dignified future. Santa Marta must be the death knell for the fossil era and the new dawn of people's energy sovereignty in Indonesia.

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